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Scenario: A notorious bank robber is released on bail from the
city jail following his most recent arrest for bank robbery. A police
officer follows the robber to an anticipated rendezvous with
suspected accomplices. From his vantage point on the outside of the
apartment,1 the officer observes the thieves begin to divide the
stolen bank proceeds.
Now armed with unassailable probable cause to arrest the
accomplices and to seize the stolen money the officer faces a
dilemma. What is a police officer, schooled in the fourth
amendment 2 and mindful of the competing concerns of the
*B.A., North Dakota State University, 1975;J.D., University of North Dakota, 1978; Assistant
State's Attorney, Cass County, North Dakota.
1. The officer, of course, is immensely clever and is familiar with fourth amendment principles
including "curtilage," "open fields," and "reasonable expectation of privacy." See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Because his observations
are made from outside the defendants' curtilage (zone of habitation) through an open window, the
suspects do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832
(D.C. Cir.) (no fourth amendment violation when police officer looks through window after
receiving tip about narcotics violation), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution is identical. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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suspect's privacy rights and society's need for effective law
enforcement, to do? 3 The officer's choices are limited - he can
rush to obtain a search or arrest warrant or both, or he can make a
warrantless entry.4 The officer is between Scylla and Charybdis:
5
leaving the scene to obtain a warrant would likely result in the
suspects and the money disappearing; an immediate entry would
no doubt result in the robber and his confederates crying "foul"
and lead to a prolonged pretrial suppression hearing with an
uncertain result. Law enforcement officers throughout the country
face this dilemma daily: 6 when may a law enforcement officer make
a warrantless entry because there is insufficient time to obtain a
warrant?
The starting point in answering this inquiry is the fourth
amendment. The fourth amendment does not prohibit all
warrantless searches and seizures, only those that are
unreasonable. 7 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court
has established in piecemeal fashion numerous exceptions to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement. 8 In this case by case
adoption of search warrant exceptions, the United States Supreme
3. The United States Supreme Court has on numerous occasions in many different ways
discussed the purpose and social policy of the fourth amendment. Perhaps the most quoted phrase is
from Johnson v. UnitedStates:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Johnson v. United States, 333 US. 10, 13-14 (1948). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
109 (1977) (per curiam).
4. There is no doubt that some fourth amendment scholars would argue that the officer should
not arrest the suspects until they leave the apartment. See Lockney, Perspectivet on State v. Nagel: The
North Dakota Supreme Court's Discordant Medley of Fourth Amendment Doctrines, 58 N.D.L. REv. 727
(1982). This may not be a reasonable alternative. The officer is alone, and the suspects are dividing
the money. The officer may reasonably expect that each suspect will leave the apartment
immediately and depart in a separate direction. See United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d at 843-44;
United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 34-36 (9th Cir. 1974); see also 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 6.5, at 449-50 (1978). Furthermore, although the officer may call for assistance, one must
assume that help would not arrive before the suspects began to leave.
5. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 163-68 (A. Cooke trans. 1967). Homer's Odyssey details the travels of
Odysseus and his return from the Trojan War. Charybdis was a dangerous whirlpool off the coast of
Italy, opposite a rocky cave where the six-headed monster Scylla lived. To avoid the whirlpool and
certain destruction, ships had to pass near Scylla who would grab and devour seamen.
6. See United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (warrantless entry necessary to
prevent destruction of evidence).
7. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 29-34
(1963). The United States Supreme Court, however, has stated in almost every major fourth
amendment case that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to certain exceptions. See,
e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at
357.
8. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion) (plain view
doctrine); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (automobile exception); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(automobile exception).
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Court has contended that search warrant exceptions are few,
narrow, and well-delineated. 9
The rationale often cited for the various exceptions is that the
"exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. "10 Many
courts, including occasionally the United States Supreme Court, 1
have referred to a separate search warrant exception entitled
"exigent circumstances," which is used to justify a warrantless
entry. I2
The term "exigent circumstances," however, describes a
number of factually distinguishable situations and indiscriminate
overuse of this phrase results in much confusion. The cases
applying this emergency exception fit roughly into five categories: 1
3
1) emergencies in which life, health, or property is threatened, 2)
hot pursuit, 3) crime scene investigation, 4) element in other search
warrant exceptions, and 5) emergencies in which evidence or
suspects might disappear.
The first category usually consists of those cases in which an
officer makes a noninvestigative entry to rescue occupants or
property. Often these entrys are made without probable cause,'
4
9. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 454-55; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at
357. Search warrant exceptions, however, are not necessarily few, narrow, or well-delineated. See
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (Court upheld a warrantless search that did not fit neatly into
any pre-existing pigeonholes); Franklin v. State, 18 Md. App. 651, __, 308 A.2d 752, 761 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1973) (judge Moylan referred to the case as creating a new exception entitled "search
incident to a detention, based upon probable cause but not amounting to arrest, for readily
destructible evidence").
10. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 455.
11. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
at 477-78.
12. See Mascolo, The Duration of Emergency Searches: The Investigative Search and the Issue of Re-Entry,
55 N.D.L. REV. 7 (1979); Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the
Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 419 (1973).
13. Because an emergency presents a myriad of variables, all cases will not fit neatly into these
categories. The doctrine of emergency has been characterized to include the following:
Law enforcement officers may enter private premises without either an arrest or a
search warrant in "hot (or prompt) pursuit" of a fleeing suspect; to arrest, or to
prevent the imminent escape of, a dangerous criminal, or to seize hazardous evidence,
on the basis of probable cause to believe that either the suspect, the possessor, or the
materials are within the premises, and time is of the essence so as to realistically
preclude recourse to a warrant; to prevent the actual, or imminently threatened loss,
destruction, or removal of seizable evidence; to preserve life or property or to render
first aid and assistance, provided they have reasonable grounds to believe that there is
an urgent need for such assistance and protective action, or to promptly launch a
limited investigation involving a substantial and continuing threat of imminent danger
to either life, health, or property, and provided, further, that they do not enter, in any
such instance, with a predetermined intent either to arrest or to search; to protect the
premises against a felony in progress; and to conduct a reasonable inspection to
determine the cause of a fire while it is still burning, or reasonably following its
suppression, and to seize evidence either relevant to the cause of the blaze or of an
unrelated crime inadvertently discovered.
Mascolo, The Duration of Emergency Searches: The Investigative Search and the Issue of Re-Entry, 55 N.D.L.
REv. 7, 13-14 (1979).
14. Many courts label this category the emergency doctrine and limit its availability to cases in
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however there are cases in this category in which probable cause
clearly exists. 15 The hot pursuit exception is used to describe
situations in which a police officer is allowed to make a warrantless
arrest (and search) of a fleeing criminal in the suspect's home. 
16
A third group of cases discusses exigent circumstances in the
context of crime scene investigations. A number of state courts
17
specifically held that these investigations constituted a separate
search warrant exception and allowed the police to conduct an
unlimited search and seizure at the scene of a crime. 18 The United
States Supreme Court refused to recognize this exception. 1 9
Limited investigation, however, is usually justified pursuant to a
rationale similar to that of the cases in category number one.20
Subsequent investigation, however, requires a search warrant or
search warrant exception.2
The phrase "exigent circumstances" is also used as an
element in other search warrant exceptions. For example, the
automobile exception, or Carroll doctrine, 22 requires two elements:
probable cause and exigent circumstances. 23 Similarily, exigent
circumstances is often cited in conjunction with the stop and frisk
exception. 24
Finally, this overworked and misunderstood phrase is often
which probable cause to search or arrest does not exist. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173,
347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1976); State v. Jordan, 79 Wash. 2d 480, 487 P.2d 617 (1971);
State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 506 P.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1973); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597,
201 N.W.2d 153 (1972).
15. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger,J., concurring), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 860 (1963).
16. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
17. E.g., State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, -, 566 P.2d 273, 283-84 (1977); State v. Chapman,
250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969); People v. Tyler, 50 Mich. App. 414, 213 N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd, 399 Mich. 564, 250 N.W.2d 467 (1977), aff'd, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
18. The rationale most often cited for the existence of a separate exception was that the search
was not unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment and that there was a need for
prompt investigation. See, e.g., State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, __, 489 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1972).
19. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978).
20. The reason this issue did not reach the United States Supreme Court until 1978 was
probably that the majority of searches in this category could be justified on the basis of consent or
lack of standing to complain. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, S 6.5, at 458-66.
21. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392-93; Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509-10. In Mincey
the Court was concerned with the legality of a four-day investigation of a homicide scene. The Court
had no trouble. upholding the initial entry nor finding the four-day search unreasonable. The middle
ground was to be'decided by the Arizona Supreme Court on remand. 437 U.S. at 402. See State v.
Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, -, 636 P.2d 637, 648-50 (1981) (all evidence admissible on remand based
upon plain view doctrine and good faith of police officers). In Tyler the Court was concerned with an
arson investigation encompassing the day of the fire and the following day and with entries made
approximately 4, 7, and 25 days later. The Court upheld the initial warrantless entry to fight the fire
and the right of firemen to remain or re-enter for a reasonable time thereafter to investigate the cause
of the blaze. 436 U.S. at 510.
22. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
23. Id. at 159. See Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not - A Rationale in
Search ofa Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (search necessary to discover weapons); State v.




used to describe the situation in which a residence is entered
without a warrant to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence.25 A
corollary to this category is the warrantless entry into a dwelling to
arrest those present to prevent them from escaping.
2 6
This Article is concerned with this last category of cases. In
State v. Nage127 the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the
destruction or loss of evidence issue as it relates to a warrantless
entry to make an arrest. 28 In the Nagel decision the North Dakota
Supreme Court has answered, at least partially, a question that the
United States Supreme Court has declined to answer. 29 This
Article will discuss the destruction or loss of evidence exception, its
history and evolution in both the United States and North Dakota
Supreme Courts, and its anticipated future application.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
In the companion cases of Payton v. New York3° and Riddick v.
New York3 the United States Supreme Court decided that the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a
suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest.32 The
Court, however, expressly reserved ruling on the question of what
25. See Note, Warrantless Residential Searches to Prevent the Destruction of Evidence. A Need for Strict
Standards, 70J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1979).
26. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263,
545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
27. 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981).
28. State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (N.D. 1981).
29. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 582-83 (reserving question of what constitutes exigent
circumstances).
30. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
31. Id. Payton and Riddick were consolidated on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
at 576.
32. Cf United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In Watson the Court held that a
warrantless arrest in a public place was constitutionally permissible if based upon probable cause
even though there was sufficient time to obtain a warrant. Id. at 423-24. The Court, however, did
not decide the issue of warrantless arrest in a suspect's dwelling. Justice Stewart, in his concurring
opinion, stated:
The arrest in this case was made upon probable cause in a public place in broad
daylight. The Court holds that this arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and
I agree. The Court does not decide, nor could it decide in this case, whether or under
what circumstances an officer must obtain a warrant before he may lawfully enter a
private place to effect an arrest.
Id. at 433 (Stewart,J., concurring); see also id. at 418 n.6.
Lower courts, both federal and state, that have addressed this issue have not been unanimous.
Compare Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978) (warrantless entry found
illegal) with People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978) (entry
allowed). The majority of courts that have considered the question have required a warrant to enter a
dwelling for either an arrest or search, absent exigent circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Houle, 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1979). Many states, however, including North Dakota, have allowed
these entries by statutory provision. N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-06-14 (1974). For a list of the states with
statutory provisions, see Payton, 445 U.S. at 598-99 n.46.
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circumstances would have to be present to justify a warrantless
entry because of insufficient time to obtain a warrant saying,
"[W]e have no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or
dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'exigent
circumstances' that would justify a warrantless entry into a home
for the purpose of either arrest or search. "3
Although a majority34 of the United States Supreme Court has
not directly ruled on the destruction or loss of evidence question,
the Court has, in dicta, suggested in a number of decisions the
existence of such an exception.
In Johnson v. United States 5 the defendant was arrested and
convicted of a narcotics violation after his hotel was searched
without a warrant.36 The probable cause for the entry was based in
part on the odor of burning opium that the officers smelled while
outside the suspect's room in the hallway of the hotel. Although the
United States Supreme Court suppressed the evidence in question,
the Court suggested that if the evidence or contraband had been
threatened with removal or destruction the result may have been
different." 7
Similarily in McDonald v. United States 8 the Court found
insufficient justification for a warrantless entry and search in an
illegal lottery case. Although the Court found ample probable cause
to obtain a search warrant, a warrantless entry was not justified as
the defendant was not fleeing or seeking to escape, "[nior was the
property in the process of destruction. "39
Three years after Johnson and McDonald the United States
Supreme Court issued one of its broadest statements to date. In
33. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 583.
34. In Ker v. California a plurality of the Court held alternatively that destruction or loss of
evidence justified the warrantless entry. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41-42 (1963). See infra notes
45-51 and accompanying 
text.
35. 333 U.S. 10(1948).
36. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12 (1948). The constitutional protections provided
by the fourth amendment have been extended to hotel rooms. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
490 (1964).
37. 333 U.S. at 14-15. The Court stated:
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law
enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's
warrant for search may be dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is
offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and
some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a
magistrate. These are never very convincing reasons and, in these circumstances,
certainly are not enough to by-pass the constitutional requirement. No suspect was
fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of a movable
vehicle. No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction,
except perhaps the fumes which we suppose in time would disappear.
Id.
38, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
39. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
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United States v. Jeffers40 a policeman and hotel detective entered the
defendants' room while they were gone and seized narcotics
without a warrant.4 1 The Court disallowed the search but
appeared, by negative inference, to adopt a destruction or loss of
evidence exception when it noted the following:
[The occupants] were not even present when the entry,
search and seizure were conducted, nor were there
exceptional circumstances present to justify the action of
the officers. There was no question of violence, no
movable vehicle was involved, nor was there an arrest or
an imminent destruction, removal or concealment of the
property intended to be seized. In fact, the officers admit
they could have easily prevented any such destruction or
removal by merely guarding the door.
42
Thus, by stating what was not present, the Court implied that if the
property were in the process of imminent destruction, removal, or
concealment, a warrantless entry would have been allowed.
In this trilogy of cases, however, the Court did not specify the
parameters of the threatened destruction of evidence. For example,
does McDonald require the evidence actually be in the process of
destruction? Is a threatened destruction as described in Johnson
sufficient? What constitutes "imminent" destruction of evidence as
mentioned inJeffers?
Two years after the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio43 the
United States Supreme Court decided Ker v. California,4 4 the first
decision that appeared to allow a warrantless entry on the basis of
threatened destruction of evidence. In Ker the defendant was
convicted of possession of marijuana based in part on evidence that
was seized without a warrant from his apartment. The police
developed probable cause to justify the entry and arrest after two
days of surveillance of a known drug dealer, during which time an
unwitting informant purchased marijuana from the dealer and
delivered the contraband to an undercover agent. The day after this
delivery police officers observed a similar encounter between the
defendant Ker and the drug dealer. The officer, however, did not
see any substance pass between the two men. The officers began to
40. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
41. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 50(1951).
42. Id. at 52.
43. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule made applicable to the states through the fourth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution).
44. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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follow Ker but lost him in traffic when he made a U-turn in the
middle of the block. The police subsequently located Ker's
apartment by checking his automobile registration and, without a
warrant, entered his apartment with a passkey provided by the
manager. 
4 5
In a plurality decision, 46 the Court upheld the warrantless
entry against a multitude of objections, 47 including the argument
that the officers should have obtained a search warrant.4 8 In a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice Brennan, four of the judges
disagreed. 49 Nonetheless, the dissenters appeared to recognize an
exception for destruction or loss of evidence:
Even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person
within, the Fourth Amendment is violated by an
unannounced police intrusion into a private home, with
or without an arrest warrant, except (1) where the persons
45. Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 25-29 (1963).
46. Id. at 24. Justice Clark wrote for eight members of the Court in the wake of Mapp v. Ohio,
establishing in Ker a standard to be used in determining the question of reasonableness of a state
search and seizure. In applying the standard to the facts in the case, however, Justice Clark was
joined only by Justices Black, Stewart, and White in holding that the search was valid. Id. Justice
Harlan concurred in the affirmance of the lower court judgment but on the ground that the seizures
did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 44.
47. In addition to arguing the warrantless entry issue, the defendant contended that probable
cause for his arrest was lacking and that the method of entry was unlawful because the police did not
"knock and announce" their authority and purpose. Id. at 34-41.
48. Id. at 41-42. The Court stated:
[Wle agree with the California court that time clearly was of the essence. The officers'
observations and their corroboration, which furnished probable cause for George
Ker's arrest, occurred at about 9 p.m., approximatey one hour before the time of
arrest. The officers had reason to act quickly because of Ker's furtive conduct and the
likelihood that the marijuana would be distributed or hidden before a warrant could be
obtained at that time of night.
Id. at 42. The Court's reasoning in Ker concerning the warrantless entry is confusing. The Court
specifically stated in the opinion that for the search to be valid, it must fall within the search warrant
exception of search incident to an arrest. Id. at 34-35, 41-42. The Court, however, appeared to rely
on the actual or potential threat of destruction or loss of evidence as an additional basis for the
decision:
Petitioners contend that the search was unreasonable in that the officers could
practically have obtained a search warrant. The practicability of obtaining a warrant
is not the controlling factor when a search is sought to be justified as incident to arrest.
... [W~e agree with the California court that time clearly was of the essence.
Id. at 41-42. Furthermore, in a footnote to the above statement, the Court appeared to distinguish
the facts in Ker from other decisions in which the Court disallowed warrantless entries. The Court
reasoned:
In cases in which a search could not be regarded as incident to arrest because the
petitioner was not present at the time of the entry and search, the absence of
compelling circumstances, such as the threat of destruction of evidence, supported the
Court's holdings that searches without warrants were unconstitutional.
Id. at 42 n.13.
49. Id. at 46. Justice Brennan was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and
Goldberg.
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within already know of the officers' authority and
purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief
that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm,
or (3) where those within, made aware of the presence of
someone outside (because, for example, there has been a
knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies
the officers in the belief that an escape or the destruction of evidence
is being attempted. 50
Although a plurality decision, Ker appears to expressly adopt the
destruction or loss of evidence exception. The commentators,
however, have not widely cited the Ker decision for this
proposition.51
The Court continued.! -its discussion of warrantless searches
and exigent circumstances in Vale v. Louisiana.53 The police had
obtained arrest warrants for the defendant Vale and were watching
him when they observed a suspected narcotics transaction outside
the house. When the police approached Vale he quickly hurried
back toward the house where the police arrested him on the steps of
the home. The police made a cursory inspection of the house to see
if anyone was inside. Minutes later Vale's mother and brother
entered the premises, at which time the police searched the house
without a warrant and found narcotics in a rear bedroom.
54
The United States Supreme Court suppressed the evidence
seized in this warrantless search restating the standard of
50. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
51. The reason for this apparent oversight is that Ker is viewed as a search incident to arrest
decision, see, e.g., Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, - n.31, 292 A.2d 762, 772 n.31 (Ct. App.
1972), and not as a destruction or loss of evidence decision, See Note, Warrantless Residential Searches to
Prevent the Destruction of Evidence: A Need for Strict Standards, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1979)
(the commentator, in a discussion of all relevant United States Supreme Court decisions in this area,
does not mention the Ker decision).
In 1978 the United States Supreme Court appeared to attach more significance than do the
commentators to the Ker decision. For example, in Tyler the Court cited Ker to support a
"warrantless and unannounced entry of a dwelling by police to prevent imminent destruction of
evidence." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
52. The Court decided three more cases prior to Vale v. Louisiana that are worth mentioning. In
Chapman v. United States the Court suppressed the warrantless search and seizure of an unregistered
distillery at the petitioner's home. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961). The Court
relied on Johnson, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), stating that "no evidence or contraband was threatened with
removal or destruction, except perhaps the fumes which we suppose in time would disappear." 365
U.S. at 615. In Schmerber v. California the Court upheld the warrantless seizure of a blood sample from
a defendant charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol. Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 772 (1966). The Schmerber Court relied in part upon a destruction of evidence rationale. Id.
at 770-71. The seizure of the blood sample, however, was also considered to be incident to the
defendant's arrest pursuant to Chimel. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (allowing search of
area within immediate control of the person arrested). Therefore, Schmerber's precedential value for
warrantless entry into a dwelling is questionable. Finally, a year later in the landmark decision of
Warden v. Hayden, the Court adopted the hot pursuit exception. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298-99 (1967). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
53. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
54. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 31-33 (1970).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
destruction of evidence espoused nineteen years earlier in
McDonald,15 that the goods seized "were not in the process of
destruction." 5 6 The dissenting Justices, 5 7 however, pointed out the
Court's apparent inconsistency:
[T]he Court suggests that the contraband was not "in the
process of destruction." None of the cases cited by the
Court supports the proposition that "exceptional
circumstances" exist only when the process of destruction
has already begun. On the contrary we implied that those
circumstances did exist when "evidence or contraband
was threatened with removal or destruction. ,58
Having displayed an inconsistency on the issue of emergency
searches, the Court expressly reserved the question of what
constitutes exigent circumstances in Payton v. New York. 59 Thus,
each state court was free to adopt its own solution to the complex
problem of emergency searches.
III. THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
APPROACH
The North Dakota Supreme Court had a number of
opportunities prior to State v. Nagel" to discuss the concept of
exigent circumstances. In State v. Matthews,61 a North Dakota
encyclopedia on fourth amendment law, the court was confronted
with a unique situation in which it was essentially asked whether
two packages at a bus depot were more like a car or a house. 62 In
other words, the court had to decide whether the movable character
55. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
56. Vale, 399 U.S. at 35.
57. Justice Black wasjoined by ChiefJustice Burger in dissent. Id. at 36.
58. Id. at 39. That the Court has continued to show indecision in this area is indicated by the
Court's statement in Michzgan v. Tyler: "Our decisions have recognized that a warrantless entry by
criminal law enforcement officals may be legal when there is compelling need for official action and
no time to secure a warrant." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509. The Tyler Court went on to cite
Ker as a case which allowed a warrantless entry to prevent imminent destruction of evidence. Id.
59. 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). After Vale the Court also decided another "hot pursuit" case,
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), and the two "crime scene" cases, Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499 (1978), and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). See supra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text. Finally, the Court opened a new chapter in search warrant exceptions, see supra
note 11 and accompanying text, and added a new concept to the exigent circumstances idea with its
decision in Cupp v. Murphy. The Cupp Court, allowing the warrantless seizure of fingernail scrapings
from a murder suspect who was not yet arrested, relied on the presence of probable cause for the
arrest, the limited nature of the intrusion, and the "highly evanescent" nature of the evidence. Cupp
v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973).
60. 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981).
61. 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974).
62. State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90, 100 (N.D. 1974).
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of the packages allowed an analogy to the Carroll automobile
exception, thus permitting a warrantless search. 63
In Matthews the Jamestown police and North Dakota Crime
Bureau developed probable cause to believe that two packages
containing marijuana were being sent from Arizona to Jamestown
by Greg Anderson to two unidentified persons. The two packages
arrived at the Jamestown bus depot, the authorities were notified,
and police maintained surveillance until the packages were picked
up. The package involved in the Matthews decision was in the
possession of the bus company, with full knowledge of the police,
approximately twenty-two hours before it was picked up. During
this time and prior to the arrest of the defendant the package was
opened without a warrant at the direction of a North Dakota Crime
Bureau agent.
64
Prior to discussing the issues in the case, the court outlined a
number of principles applicable to search and seizure questions
generally. 65 The court then discussed some of the search warrant
exceptions recognized by the United States Supreme Court and
concluded with a discussion of exigent circumstances:
The State seems to claim that a category of "exigent
circumstances" constitutes a separate exception to the
general rule that search warrants must be obtained prior
to searches and seizures . . . . However, we believe that
the term "exigent circumstances" originated as a
shorthand way of describing those facts which give rise to
a previously accepted exception to the rule, and not as a
new exception in itself....
We conclude that "exigent circumstances" is not an
exception to the requirement of a warrant, but is only a
handy way of describing the circumstances which give
63. The prosecution in Matthews, in claiming exigent circumstances, was not alone in its
position. See, e.g., United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1973) (search of suitcases at airport
supported by exigent circumstances); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1971) (search
of suitcase permissible as search incident to arrest); People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d
1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972) (search of boxes at airport reasonable because probable cause
existed), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Waugh v. State, 20 Md. App. 682, 318 A.2d 204 (Ct. App.
1974) (warrantless search of suitcase at airport permissible because of exigent circumstances), rev'don
factual grounds, 275 Md. 22, 338 A.2d 268 (1975). Cf Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
(warrant required to search luggage taken from automobile); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977) (United States Supreme Court decided against the automobile-package (suitcase) analogy),
64. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d at 95.
65. Id. at 99. The Matthews court established that all warrantless searches are unreasonable
unless pigeonholed into an established search warrant exception, that the burden of proof on a
motion to suppress is on the state, and that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is
inadmissible in court. Id.
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rise to one or another of the generally recognized
exceptions mentioned earlier. 66
Although the Matthews court stated that exigent circumstances
was not a separate search warrant exception, the court did consider
the State's argument on the merits and suppressed the evidence. 67
Even though case law existed that applied the Carroll doctrine to
packages, 68 the majority of those cases were distinguishable because
the law enforcement officers did not have probable cause for a
substantial period of time prior to the search and seizure of the
package.6 9 While the court did not specifically recognize exigent
circumstances as a separate search warrant exception in Matthews,
it may be because no exigency actually existed. 70
In State v. Page7' the North Dakota Supreme Court was
presented with its next opportunity to consider the proper role of
exigent circumstances. Two masked men robbed a farmer at
gunpoint in Ward County. During an immediate investigation the
police discovered boot prints and tire tracks in the snow near the
victim's home. Investigation began to focus on two brothers, Brian
and Randall Page, after interviews of nearby neighbors revealed
that the brothers were in the area immediately prior to the robbery.
When the police compared tire tracks and boot prints found
near the farmer's home with those found outside the Page
brothers', they discovered a near perfect match. The police were
allowed to enter the Page residence, and the brothers agreed to
accompany the police to the station for further investigation. While
66. Id. at 100.
67. Id. at 102-03. The court concluded that there were no exigent circumstances because "[t]he
package was under constant surveillance by the police, who had arranged with the common carrier to
hold it in a nonpublic area until such time as it was called for while the police were present. There
was no danger of destruction, removal or concealment." Id. The court also stated:
It may be that the officers who made the warrantless search of the package in the
Jamestown bus depot had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed,
but probable cause alone, without a search warrant or a simultaneous, valid arrest or
other exigent circumstances, is insufficient to justify a warrantless search .... There
was ample time to obtain a warrant; the package was, in effect, in the custody of the
police, since they had made arrangements to hold it until they authorized delivery;
and no other legitimate excuse for not obtaining a warrant is shown.
Id. at 104.
68: See supra note 63.
69. 216 N.W.2d at 101. The North Dakota court specifically distinguished People v.
McKinnon, 500 P.2d 1097 (1972), by noting "that the exigencies of the situation were different in
McKinnon." Matthews, 216 N.W.2dat 101.
70. The Matthews court's discussion of the issue on the merits is confusing. Did the court mean
to imply that if probable cause for the search of the package developed at the same time or shortly
before the consignor (Matthews) arrived to pick up the package, the search or at least the seizure
could have been made without a warrant? In other words, was the court acknowledging a separate
search warrant exception for the destruction or loss of evidence instead of relying on the exigent
circumstances concept?
71. 277 N.W.2d 112(N.D. 1979).
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one of the brothers was getting dressed, the police observed a large
amount of money in his wallet. Both brothers were arrested for the
robbery. A search warrant was subsequently executed on the
defendants' apartment and automobile, leading to the discovery of
miscellaneous evidentiary items."
The defendants challenged the initial warrantless entry on the
grounds that it violated their fourth amendment rights. 7 3 The court
found that one of the brothers had consented to the entry, thus
waiving any fourth amendment protection. 
7 4
The court, however, proceeded to consider the defendants'
fourth amendment claim on the merits.7 5 The court acknowledged
that the United States Supreme Court had not yet ruled on whether
an arrest warrant was required for police to arrest a suspect in a
dwelling.7 6  The North Dakota court then looked to other
jurisdictions for guidance, relying upon the Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia's decision in Dorman v. United States. 77
The Dorman court 78 held that a warrantless nonconsensual
entry into a dwelling to make a routine arrest was
unconstitutional. 79 The federal court did, however, enunciate six
guidelines to determine when exigent circumstances exist to allow a
warrantless entry to make an arrest. 80 Before considering whether
72. State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 114(N.D. 1979).
73. Id. at 116.
74. Id, at 116-17. The court was explicit in its reasoning:
From the record it appears that the Pages are intelligent and aware individuals,
capable of refusing entry to the officers. Randall Page, nevertheless, chose to invite the
officers in, even after he was informed that their purpose was to inquire about
activities the previous evening. From the totality of the circumstances we conclude
consent was voluntarily given to enter.
Id. at 117.
75. Id. The Page court does not clearly indicate whether the discussion of the warrantless entry is
dictum or an alternative basis for the court's decision. Because the discussion of the consent issue
appears first and because consent is normally viewed as a waiver of any fourth amendment objection,
the discussion of the entry on the merits appears to be dictum.
76. Id. The court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had elected to decide the
issue in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 277 N.W.2d at 117 n.l.
77. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
78. The Dorman decision was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Payton. Payton,
445 U.S. at 575 n.4, 587-88.
79. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 391.
80. Id. at 392-93. The guidelines were summarized by the Pagecourt as follows:
(1) A grievous offense is involved, particularly one that is a crime of violence;
(2) The suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
(3) There exists a clear showing of probable cause;
(4) There is a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being
entered;
(5) There is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended;
and
(6) The unconsented entry is peaceably made.
277 N.W.2d at 118.
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these guidelines should be adopted in North Dakota, the Page court
distinguished the Matthews statement made five years earlier
regarding exigent circumstances. 8  The North Dakota court
distinguished exigent circumstances necessary to justify an entry
for an arrest from exigent circumstances necessary to justify an
entry for a search.
8 2
In the same opinion, however, the North Dakota court
appeared to accept a general definition of exigent circumstances
from a California court: "The term 'exigent circumstances' has
been defined as an emergency situation requiring swift action to
prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or
to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of
evidence. "8,a3
In applying these concepts to the facts in Page the court found
that the officers' entry was lawful, with or without the defendants'
consent.84 In so holding, the court reduced the Dorman court's
guidelines to a two-pronged inquiry: (1) Is there probable cause to
arrest? (2) Will the time and circumstances effectively prohibit the
officers from obtaining a warrant? 85 The court, however, did not
appear to distinguish an entry to arrest from an entry to search. 86
81. 277 N.W.2d at 117-18. The Page court distinguished its conclusion that exigent cir-
cumstances did not constitute a separate search warrant exception by saying that "[tjhe existence of
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry for arrest necessarily differ somewhat from those
applicable to a search." Id. (citing United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 1974)).
82. 277 N.W.2d at 117-18.
83. Id. at 117 (citing People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d. 263, -, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 637 (1976)). The location of this definition in the Page opinion is interesting. The court
initially cited the Dorman decision for the proposition that a nonconsensual warrantless entry into a
home to make an arrest is unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. The court then acknowledged
the definition of exigent circumstances from the California Supreme Court opinion before
distinguishinga search from an arrest situation. 277 N.W.2d at 117.
84. 277 N.W.2d at 119.
85. Id. at 118. The Page court reduced the Dorman court's guidelines to a two-pronged inquiry in
response to a commentator's criticism of the Dorman guidelines. Id. The commentator had stated that
the Dorman guidelines may be "too sophisticated to be applied, requiring. . . the making of on-the-
spot decisions by a complicated weighing and balancing ofa multitude of imprecise factors." Id. See 2
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.1, at 386-90 (1978).
86. 277 N.W.2d at 118-19. The Page court described the factors necessitating an entry as
follows:
Here, the officers had probable cause to enter the Page apartment. The
circumstances surrounding the entry did not, in fairness, require delay. Swift action to
prevent possible escape by the suspects and to preserve the fruits of the robbery may be
essential to effective law enforcement. When the officers had obviously located the
suspects' car and apartment, it would have been foolhardy not to make further inquiry
of the apartment occupants. Because a Pontiac, identified as the one seen in the
Sawyer area, was parked outside, it was reasonable to assume that the Page brothers
might be in the apartment. In addition, it was not unreasonable to assume that the
apartment occupants had seen the officers examining tire and boot tracks and would
have escaped or destroyed any incriminating evidence while the officers were
procuring a warrant. Although it may have been wise when viewed with hindsight, we
do not fault the officers for failing to post a "stake out" while a warrant was being
obtained.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court had one more minor
opportunity to discuss the exigent circumstances concept. In State v.
Johnsona7 the court was concerned with the admissibility of a stolen
air compressor that was discovered outside the defendant Johnson's
mobile home approximately ten months after the theft. s8 After two
visits to the home, and although Johnson was not at home, the
sheriff seized the air compressor without a warrant. 89
On appeal, the court used unusual reasoning to suppress the
warrantless seizure. The court initially acknowledged the general
statement from Matthews that exigent circumstances do not
constitute a separate search warrant exception,9" but the court went
on to hold that "we cannot, in the absence of exigent circumstances,
condone his failure to secure a warrant."91 The court concluded,
"In no instance is this type of shortcut more apparent than in the
present case in which the warrant requirement was bypassed in the
absence of exigent circumstances. ''92
The stage was set for State v. Nagel.93 With the background
provided by Matthews94 and Page95 and the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Payton,96 the North Dakota Supreme
Court was prepared to invoke the destruction or loss of evidence
exception.
The Nage197 case involved three young men who were involved
in the trafficking of methamphetamines. 98 One of them was Jay
Braaten who as an unwitting informant delivered controlled
substances three times to agents of the North Dakota Drug
Enforcement Unit. At the scene of his third and final delivery,
which involved over $10,000.00 worth of methamphetamines,
Braaten was arrested. 99 At the time of his arrest, Braaten informed
Special Agent Murphy that Braaten had received the drugs in
question from Garyo ° and Nagel, and that if he were not back
87. 301 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1981).
88. State v.Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 626(N.D. 1981).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 628. In fact, the court directly quoted the exigent circmstanccs langu.igc frol
Matthews. Id.
91. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981).
94. State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974). See supra notes 61-70 a id accor.pan inL
text.
95. State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1979). See 5upra notes 71-86 ,id acccinpanying tex.
96. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). See supra notes 30-33 ai~d accompanying text.
97. State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981).
98. Methamphetamine is a schedule I controlled substance. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03. 1 -0
(1981).
99. 308 N.W.2d at 540. Although Biaaten's arrest was warrantless, it occurred in the parking
lot of a grocery store; therefore, it was valid pursuant to United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976) (warrantless public arrest permissible). Seesupra note 32 and accompanying text.
100. 308 N.W.2d at 540. At the time of his arrest, Gary was a juvenile and the cour chose a
pseudonym. Id.
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within twenty minutes, they would know that something had gone
wrong. Braaten also informed Agent Murphy that Gary and Nagel
had additional drugs in their residence. The information about
where Braaten had obtained the drugs was corroborated by a
surveillance team who monitored Braaten's movements prior to his
arrest. 10 1 Prior to the execution of a search warrant requested by
Agent Murphy, the surveillance team entered the residence and
arrested Gary and Nagel. 10 2 Execution of the warrant revealed
marijuana in the living room and a large cache of
methamphetamines in Gary's bedroom. 103
After the arrest and search but prior to the district court's
ruling on the defendants' subsequent suppression motions, the
United States Supreme Court decided Payton. 104 Applying the
Payton decision retroactively the lower court suppressed the
warrantless entry as well as the subsequent searches. 05 The court
also refused to find that exigent circumstances justified the entry, 106
relying upon Page. 107
The State appealed, raising three issues, 108 but it is the
author's belief that the central issue was the surveillance team's
101. Id. Braaten had delivered methamphetamines on two prior occasions, including a delivery
on the day before the arrest. At that time, arrangements were made for a larger delivery. There were
numerous phone calls that evening and the next day between Braaten and Murphy concerning the
procurement and exchange of the drugs. In one of the phone calls made the day of the arrest, Braaten
informed Murphy that he was going to his "man" to obtain the drugs. The surveillance team then
followed Braaten to Monte's residence, where Braaten remained for approximately two hours.
During this time Braaten again called Murphy, this time informing him that Braaten was at the
source of his supply but that there would be a short delay. Braaten then changed the location of the
exchange. The reason for the delay was to "round up" the entire quantity of drugs that had been
agreed upon. During this time the surveillance team observed another person, later identified as
Gary, leaving the residence. Gary was then lost in traffic. Gary returned, and Braaten left shortly
thereafter carrying what appeared to be a package. Based upon the above activitity and Braaten's
statement at the time of his arrest, the drug agents clearly had probable cause to request a search
warrant. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (plurality of the Court recognized
the inherent credibility of statements made against a penal interest). That the probable cause
question was never an issue in the lower court was no doubt the reason for the North Dakota
Supreme Court's brief treatment of the issue. See 308 N.W.2d at 547.
102. 308 N.W.2d at 540. Murphy informed the surveillance team by radio of Braaten's
statements and the team entered the apartment approximately 20 minutes later. The warrant was
not obtained for approximately two hours. Id.
103. Id. at 540-41.
104. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
105. 308 N.W.2d at 542.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 542. The lower court found that three of the six Dorman guidelines were absent;
therefore, exigent circumstances did not exist. Id.
108. Id. at 541. The court quoted the State's issues in the opinion:
I. Does the United States Supreme Court Opinion in Payton and Riddick v. New
York that prohibited law enforcement agents from making a warrantless entry
into a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest apply retroactively?
II. Assuming retroactive application of Payton and Riddick, was the seizure of the
controlled substances involved in this case pursuant to a valid search warrant
the 'derivative fruit' of an unlawful entry and arrest?
"III. Did 'exigent circumstances' exist tojustify the warrantless entry and arrest?"
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warrantless entry into the residence. 109 The North Dakota Supreme
Court phrased the issue as follows: "Is the imminent destruction of
evidence of a crime a sufficient exigent circumstance to make a
nonconsensual, warrantless entry into a suspect's home to arrest
him when there is probable cause to believe that a felony has been
committed by that person?" "10
To decide this issue, the court faced two alternatives: (1)
restrict the Matthews language quoted in Page and Johnson that
rejected exigent circumstances as a separate search warrant
exception"' or (2) attempt to reconcile the decisions. The court
chose the latter.
The court distinguished Matthews with the following
statement:
[W]e are not addressing the issue of whether or not the
police may enter and search without a warrant when they
have probable cause to believe a felony has been
committed and exigent circumstances exist, but whether
or not they may enter and arrest under those
circumstances. Thus, exigent circumstances in the
context of a search situation as discussed in State v.
Matthews ... is not applicable .... 112
Because the court was limiting its discussion to warrantless
entries for the purpose of an arrest, it was necessary to reconsider
the Page decision in which the court had accepted the Dorrnan
guidelines." 3 The court held that the district court was too
stringent in its application of these guidelines."14 After reconciling
its previous decision the court addressed the exigent circumstances
issue, reversing the lower court. The North Dakota Supreme Court
concluded that there was probable cause for the entry and that
109. Although the court could have avoided the issue by not applying the Payton decision
retroactively, the State urged the court to address the issue because the earlier decision in Page was
being strictly construed. Id. Thus, the court addressed this issue first. Id.
110. Id. at 543.
111. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
112. 308 N.W.2d at 543 (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 542. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
114. 308 N.W.2d at 542. The court limited the use of the Dorman guidelines as follows:
The district court erred when it determined that exigent circumstances did not
exist at the time the officers entered the residence of [Nagel] and Gary and secured the
premises. The error was in treating the Dorman guidelines as prerequisites to a lawful
arrest which must be met before there can be exigent circumstances. In other words,
by requiring the existence of all of the Dorman elements to find exigent circumstances
the court erred.
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exigent circumstances supported the entry.1 5 The court did,
however, add a caveat that a mere belief that destruction of the
evidence is probable would not be sufficient to support a
warrantless entry. 116
IV. FUTURE APPLICATION
In its decision in Nagel, the North Dakota Supreme Court
adopted a necessary and practical exception to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement. Because of dicta in prior
decisions, however, the court unnecessarily distinguished entries
for the purpose of making an arrest from entries for the purpose of
making a search.
Although certain differences still remain between warrantless
arrests and warrantless searches, 1 7 the United States Supreme
Court in Payton rejected the distinction when it involved a
warrantless entry into a dwelling. 1 8 Although the North Dakota
court's distinction between arrests and searches in a dwelling
appears arbitrary and due largely to the court's reluctance to
overrule precedent, if the court's opinion is construed as limiting a
warrantless entry to its purpose of preventing the destruction or loss
of evidence, the opinion would have solid constitutional footing.
The principle that a warrantless search (or presumably entry)
must be strictly limited to its purpose is aptly illustrated by Terry v.
Ohio, 119 in which the United States Supreme Court adopted the
stop and frisk exception to the fourth amendment warrant
115. Id. at 544. The Na4'el court stressed the need for both probable cause and exigent
circumstances:
The great probability of imminent destruction or removal of evidence constituted
exigent circumstances which permitted the officers to act when they had probable
cause to believe that a felony had been committed and there was not sufficient time to
obtain a warrant. We emphasize the necessity of the combination of probable cause
and exigent circumstances.
Id.
116. Id. The court indicated that mere belief should be "coupled with the fact that the suspects
know or will soon become aware that the police are on their trail . . . and that the entry is the least
intrusive which, under the circumstances, is possible.'" Id. (citation omitted).
117. Seesupra note 35 and accompanying text.
118. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589. The Court analyzed possible differences in the two types of entries
as follows:
The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic: the breach of the
entrance to an individual's home. The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's
privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home.
119.392 U.S. 1(1968).
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requirement. 10 The exception was adopted because the scope of
the search was found reasonable under the fourth amendment. 121
Thus, the North Dakota court's rationale in Nagel can be
viewed as a scope limitation and not necessarily as a prohibition
against all entries to search to prevent the destruction or loss of
evidence. In the Nagel case a search of the premises 122 could have
constituted a scope violation as the parties were under arrest and
the exigency extinguished. 123 Under other circumstances, however,
a warrantless entry to conduct a search could be justified under a
destruction or loss of evidence rationale. 
124
Finally, this new exception should not be used to subvert the
warrant requirement or the social policy which demands that a
neutral and detached magistrate be placed between the individual's
right to privacy and the law enforcement officer engaged in the
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 1 5 The court's
caveat 26 concerning that issue should be construed to require good
faith on behalf of law enforcement officers coupled with specific and
articulable facts to justify the entry.
120. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30(1968).
121. Id. at 30-31. The Court concluded:
The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital
a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all. The Fourth Amendment
proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of governmental actions as by
imposing preconditions upon its initiation .... Thus, evidence may not be introduced
if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related
in scope to the justification for their initiation.
Id. at 28-29.
122. Any plain view seizure, however, should be allowed under the authority of Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (evidence in plain view may be seized without a warrant).
123, See Mascolo, The Duration of Emergency Searches: The Investigative Search and the Issue of Re-Entry,
55 N.D.L. REv. 7 (1979).
124. See, e.g., People v. Clemens, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 339 N.E.2d 170, 376 N.Y.S.2d 480, cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1975).
125. Seesupra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

